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PARENTS INVOL VED & MEREDITH: A PREDICTION
REGARDING THE (UN)CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RACECONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS
EBONI S. NELSON

t

ABSTRACT

During the October 2006 Term, the United States Supreme Court
will consider the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student
assignment plans as employed in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 and Meredith v. Jefferson
County Board of Education. These cases will mark the Court'sfirst inquiry regardingthe use of race to combat de facto segregation in public
education. This article examines the constitutionality of such plans and
provides a prediction regardingthe Court's decisions.
This article begins with an analysis of the resegregation trend currently plaguing American educational institutions and identifies two
causesfor the occurrence: (1) the shift in the Supreme Court'sjurisprudence regarding desegregation; and (2) school officials' adherence to
the "neighborhood school concept" when making student assignment
decisions. This article then examines the challengedplans, specifically
their attempts to create and maintain racially diverse student bodies
through the use of racial tiebreakers and guidelines. After considering
the Supreme Court'sprior decisions and rationale regardingthe use of
race in education, this articlepredicts that the Supreme Court will strike
down both plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. In light of
this probable outcome, this article urges school officials to consider
race-neutralmethods to achieve diversity and to improve the quality of
educationprovided to disadvantaged,minority students.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2003, after a twenty-five year hiatus,1 the United States Supreme
Court reentered the passionate and controversial debate surrounding affirmative action in the context of public education. The Court's dual
decisions in Grutter v. Bollinger2 and Gratz v. Bollinger3 sanctioned the
limited use of race as a factor in higher education admissions decisions.
During the October 2006 Term, the Court will revisit the issue of affirmative action, only this time the inquiry will concern the use of race in
elementary and secondary education rather than higher education.
In a somewhat surprising announcement, the Court decided to hear
the appeals of two cases challenging school districts' use of race in student assignment decisions.4 Six months prior to the Court's decision to
hear arguments in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School DistrictNo. 15 and Meredith v. Jefferson County Boardof Education,6 the Court declined to grant certiorari in a similar case,7 thereby

1. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (analyzing the constitutionality of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education).
2.
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
3.
539 U.S. 244 (2003).
4.
See Charles Lane, Justices to Hear Cases of Race-Conscious School Placements, WASH.
POST, June 6, 2006, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2006/06/05/AR2006060500367.html.
5.
(Parents11), 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5,
2006) (No. 05-908).
6.
McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 861 (W.D. Ky. 2004),
aff'd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom., Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915). The Supreme Court has set both cases for
argument on December 4, 2006. See Argument Calendars (October Term 2006) Session Beginning
November
27,
2006,
available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oralarguments/
argument_calcndars/MonthlyArgumentCalDecember2006.pdf.

2006]

PARENTS INVOLVED & MEREDITH

prompting speculation as to the reasons for the Court's apparent aboutface. One could attribute the Court's decision to its desire to reconcile
circuit court splits regarding the constitutionality of race-conscious student assignment plans pre- and post-Grutter.8 While this reason may be
plausible, it would not appear to be the primary reason given that such
splits existed prior to the Court's certiorari denial in Comfort ex rel.
Neumyer v. Lynn School Committee.9 Others have hypothesized that the
Court's decision to grant certiorari was precipitated by the change in its
composition-a change that some think may prove to be the death knell
of desegregation.' 0
The composition of the Court that declined to hear Lynn included
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who wrote the 5 to 4 Grutter opinion upholding the use of race in higher education. Often thought of as the
"swing vote" in controversial and pivotal cases," Justice O'Connor retired from the Court in 2006.12 Following the appointment of her replacement, Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., who is commonly thought to be
a conservative Justice,13 the newly constituted Court agreed to hear Par7. See Comfort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328 (D. Mass. 2003),
af'd, 418 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005) (upholding the use of race in
elementary and secondary education student transfer policies).
8.
See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-15, Parents H, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908),
2006 WL 1579631 (detailing circuits' conflicting holdings regarding the constitutionality of raceconscious assignment plans and urging the Supreme Court to grant certiorari "to remove this uncertainty and confusion" regarding "how Grutter and Gratz affect the Equal Protection rights of students in public high schools"); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8-11, Meredith, 126 S. Ct. 2351
(No. 05-915), 2006 WL 165912 (arguing that the Court should grant certiorari because "[t]he decision of the Sixth Circuit directly conflicts with decisions of the Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Circuits
concerning voluntarily-adopted race-based student assignment plans designed to advance racial
diversity"); see also Lane, supranote 4.
9.
126 S. Ct. 798 (2005); see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-10, Lynn, 126 S. Ct. 798
(No. 05-348), 2005 WL 2275949 (noting conflicts between the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth
and Ninth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of public schools voluntarily adopting raceconscious student assignment plans to achieve racial diversity).
10. See Linda Greenhouse, Court to Weigh Race as Factorin School Rolls, N.Y. TIMES, June
6,
2006,
at
Al,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/06/washington/
06scotus.html?ex= 1307246400&en-7b7blaf6cbef8911 &ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
(suggesting that the change in Supreme Court Justices prompted the Court to grant certiorari); Lane,
supra note 4 (quoting Professor Goodwin Liu's thoughts of the Court's granting of certiorari as "bad
news for desegregation advocates .... It looks like the more conservative [Jiustices see they have a
fifth vote to reverse these cases").
11.
See Tom Curry, O'Connor Had Immense Power as Swing Vote, July 1, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5304484/ (describing Justice O'Connor as "often the swing vote that
decided
high-profile
cases");
see
also
High
Court
at
a
Crossroads,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9531661/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2006) (detailing six significant Supreme Court decisions, ranging from partial birth abortion to state sovereign immunity, in which
Justice O'Connor provided the fifth deciding vote).
12.
Although Justice O'Connor announced her resignation on July 1, 2005, it was not effective until the confirmation of her successor, which occurred on January 31, 2006, with the swearing
in of Justice Alito. See William Branigin et al., Supreme Court Justice 0 'Connor Resigns, WASH.
POST, July 1, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/07/0l/
AR2005070100653.html; Alito Sworn In as Supreme Court Justice, Jan. 31, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/l 1111624/ [hereinafter Alito Sworn In].
13.
See Alito Sworn In, supra note 12 (describing Justice Alito as a "conservative lawyer for
the Reagan administration"); Don Gonyea, All Things Considered: Republicans PraiseAlito 's Con-
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ents Involved and Meredith, which will be the first time the Court has
addressed the constitutionality of the voluntary use of race in elementary
and secondary school student assignment plans. 14 While no one can
know how any of the Justices will vote in the cases, many affirmative
action opponents hope that the additions of Justice Alito and Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.15 to the Court will result in the prohibition of
race-conscious assignment programs in public elementary and secondary
schools. 16 Supporters of affirmative action fear that such a ruling will
prompt and exacerbate resegregation trends currently plaguing public
education.17 Whether the Court upholds or strikes down the assignment
plans employed in the two cases, Parents Involved and Meredith will
significantly contribute to the jurisprudence concerning equality in public
education.
Many agree that public elementary and secondary schools are more
segregated today than they were prior to the Brown v. Board of Educaservative
Credentials (NPR
radio
broadcast
Oct.
31,
2005),
available
at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4983450 (describing Justice Alito as "a judicial favorite of the conservative movement"); Bill Mears, Alito 's Record Shows Conservative Judge,
CNN.coM, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/31/alito.record/index.html
(discussing Justice Alito's "conservative judicial philosophy" and relating views that he was "the
most conservative member of the [Third Circuit Court of Appeals]").
14.
Throughout the article, reference to the "voluntary" use of race in student assignment
plans refers to school districts' consideration of students' race absent the operation of a federally
mandated desegregation decree.
15.
Following the death of Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Chief Justice Roberts was confirmed on September 29, 2005. See Charles Babington & Peter Baker, Roberts Confirmed as 17th
Chief Justice, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/29/AR2005092900859.htm. Although void of a lengthy judicial history, Chief Justice Roberts' commentary regarding race-based affirmative action prior to
taking the bench has led some to believe that he generally opposes race-based affirmative action.
As Acting Solicitor General, Roberts' approval of a brief opposing the Federal Communications Commission's affirmative action program for broadcast licensees and later, as a
private attorney, his brief on behalf of the Associated General Contractors of America in
opposition to the government's highway construction program in AdarandConstructors
v. Pena clearly indicate that had Roberts sat in the place of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
equal access to higher education (Grutterv. Bollinger) and contracting (Adarand v. Pena)
would have been foreclosed to minorities.
Press Release, American Association for Affirmative Action Opposes Confirmation of John Roberts
for Chief Justice of U.S. Supreme Court (Sept. 5, 2005) (quoting Robert Ethridge, President of the
American Association for Affirmative Action), available at http://www.affirmativeaction.org/
press.jsp.
16.
See Lane, supra note 4 ("Sharon Browne, principal attorney of the Pacific Legal Foundation, which supports the parents' lawsuits [in ParentsInvolved and Meredith], said she 'was pleased
that the Court has decided to hear these cases. Together, these cases could put an end to schools
using race as a factor to decide where children can attend school."'); Greenhouse, supra note 10
(quoting Sharon Browne as saying, "I think the writing's on the wall, or at least I hope it is.").
17.
See Gina Holland, Supreme Court to Hear Schools Race Case, CBS NEWS, June 5, 2006,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/06/05/ap/politics/mainD8I2AB70O.shtml
("A ruling against
the schools 'would be pretty devastating to suburban communities, small towns that have successfully maintained desegregation for a couple of generations,' he said. 'The same communities that
were forced to desegregate would be forced to re-segregate."') (quoting Gary Orfield, Director of the
Civil Rights Project at Harvard University); Bob Egelko & Heather Knight, Justices Take Cases on
Race - Based Enrollment, But Prop. 209 Means California Schools Likely to be Unaffected, S.F.
CHRON., June 6, 2006, at B I (noting views that the consideration of race in public elementary and
secondary schools is necessary to "reverse growing resegregation of the schools").
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tion'8 decision.' 9 Current resegregation trends threaten thirty years of
progress that have been made in the desegregation of African-American
students, 20 thereby impeding the fulfillment of Brown's promise of educational equality. Realizing the potentially devastating effects of segregated schools, 2' several school districts have voluntarily begun to employ
race-conscious student assignment plans, such as those challenged in
Parents Involved and Meredith, to prevent and remedy resegregation of
their schools. This article examines the constitutionality of such plans
and hypothesizes that the Supreme Court will strike down both student
assignment plans employed in ParentsInvolved and Meredith as unconstitutional.
Part I begins with an analysis of factors contributing to resegregation in elementary and secondary schools. Just as the Supreme Court has
been an invaluable tool by which to desegregate public schools, some of
its decisions have also enabled resegregation to flourish. Part I also discusses the negative impact that school districts' adherence to the
"neighborhood school concept" has had on the provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students.
Part II examines the district court and Ninth Circuit opinions in
Meredith and Parents Involved. It discusses the compelling interests
asserted by the school districts to justify their narrowly tailored use of
race in student assignment decisions.
Part III analyzes the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious
student assignment plans as employed in ParentsInvolved and Meredith.
Although difficult to predict, this article hypothesizes that the Court will
invalidate both student assignment plans as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This hypothesis is predicated on the Court's previous decisions and rationale concerning the use of race in the context of public
education.
This article concludes with suggestions regarding policies and programs that school districts can utilize in their attempts to combat the se18.
(Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
19. See Hon. Robert L. Carter, The Conception of Brown, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 93, 99
(2004) (concluding that "[t]here are more segregated secondary and primary schools today than
existed before Brown"); Marvin Krislov, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: The Value, the
Method, and the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 899, 906 (2004) (concluding that many parts of the
country are experiencing segregation at levels greater than those existing when Brown was decided);
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., All Deliberate Speed?: Brown's Past and Brown's Future, 107 W. VA. L.
REV. 625, 631 (2005) (noting that "public schools in many areas are more segregated than they were
before Brown"); Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: HypersegregatedHousing Patternsand the
Failureof School Desegregation,9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 55, 65 (2002) (stating that "public schools
in many urban communities are more segregated now than they were in the pre-Brown era").
20.
See ERICA FRANKENBERG ET AL., HARV. C.R. PROJECT, A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH
THE DREAM? 4 (2003), available at
SEGREGATED
SCHOOLS:
ARE WE LOSING

http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (discussing
a twelve year decline in the desegregation of African-American students).
21.
See infra Part I (discussing the negative effects of resegregation on public education).
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vere costs imposed by racial and economic segregation in public education.
I. SCHOOL HOUSE ROCK: RESEGREGATION OF PUBLIC EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS

Throughout our history, public education has occupied a significant
role in our society. Its importance has been the bedrock of legal decisions concerning the provision of educational opportunities to undocu24
23
mented children,22 children with disabilities, and minority students.
As recognized by the Supreme Court in Brown I:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments .... It is the very foundation of good citizenship.
Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made
25
available to all on equal terms.
Unfortunately, Brown Ps recognition of the inherent inequality of
racially segregated schools 26 has not prevented such segregation from
occurring. This section explores two factors that have contributed to the
resegregation of public educational institutions: first, the shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding mandatory desegregation efforts;
and second, local school districts' adherence to the "neighborhood school
concept" when making student assignment decisions. The Supreme
Court's dilution of desegregation mandates and school districts' use of
racially segregated neighborhoods as criteria for student assignments
have both exacerbated the resegregation trends currently afflicting public
educational institutions.
A. The Court Giveth, the Court Taketh Away
The attainment of equality in public education for racial and ethnic
minority students has often been pursued via legal measures. From
22.
See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute that denied
public education to children not legally admitted to the country).
23.
See Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Garret, 526 U.S. 66, 67 (1999) (holding that Congress' intent "to open the doors of public education to all qualified children" required the school
district to provide nursing services to a quadriplegic student in accordance with federal disability law
(citing Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist., Westchester County v. Rowley, 458 U.S.
176, 192 (1982))).
24.
See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (invalidating segregation
of races in public schools); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325 (upholding the narrowly tailored use of race in
higher education admissions decisions).
25.
Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
26.
Id. at 495 ("We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but
equal' has no place. Separateeducationalfacilities are inherently unequal." (emphasis added)).
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Brown I to Grutter, Supreme Court intervention has helped to open the
school house doors for countless numbers of students of color.27 Despite
such access, however, African-American and Hispanic students continue
to lag behind their white counterparts in terms of academic achievement.2 8 This phenomenon can be explained, in part, by the environments
in which many minority students are educated.2 9
Due to the resegregation trend experienced by many public schools,
an astounding number of African-American and Hispanic children are
educated in racially and economically segregated schools. "[A]lmost
three-fourths of black and Latino students attend schools that are predominantly minority."30 Of the 2.4 million students attending schools
that are 99%-100% minority, African-American and Hispanic students
account for 2.3 million.3' Unfortunately, "[t]he schools that have the
highest minority enrollment also have the highest incidence of student
poverty: [i]n 87% of schools that are over 90% minority (AfricanAmerican and Hispanic), over half of the students come from families
living in poverty." 32 These figures are particularly disturbing when one
considers the disadvantages and challenges that students attending such
schools must overcome to succeed academically.33

27.

See Brief Amici Curiae of Veterans of the Southern Civil Rights Movement and Family

Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists in Support of Respondents at 8, Grutter,539 U.S. 306

(2003) (No. 02-241), 2003 WL 539178 (noting that the number of African-American college graduates has increased from less than 5% in 1960 to approximately 7.5% in 2000; in addition, the number
of African-American law students has increased from 1% in 1960 to 7.4% in 1996); Danielle R.
Holley, Is Brown Dying? Exploring the Resegregation Trend in our PublicSchools, 49 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REv. 1085, 1086 & n.4 (2004-2005) (discussing the positive impact of the Brown decision on
racial integration in public schools); Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice to Achieve
Desegregation, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 791, 791 n.4 (2005) ("In 1965, only 15.2% of AfricanAmericans between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine had attended college; by 1995, that
number had risen to 44.9%. Among African-Americans in that age bracket, 15.3% had completed
four or more years of college in 1995, compared to 6.8% in 1965." (citing James T. Patterson,
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 230

(2001))). "In the 1990s, college enrollment by students of color increased by nearly 50%." Id.
(citing William B. Harvey, AM. COUNCIL ON EDUC., MINORITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 2001-2002:
NINETEENTH ANNUAL STATUS REPORT 2 (2002)).

28. See Eboni S. Nelson, What Price Grutter? We May Have Won the Battle, But Are We
Losing the War?, 32 J.C. & U.L. 1, 8-9, 25-26 (2005) (discussing racial disparities in educational
achievement).
29. See Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 at 299-300 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (noting that "AfricanAmerican and Hispanic children are all too often educated in poverty-stricken and underperforming
institutions").
30.

FRANKENBERG ET AL., supra note 20, at 28.

31.
32.

Id.
James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 273 (1999); see also

GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARV. C.R. PROJECT, BROWN AT 50: KING'S DREAM OR

PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE? 22 (2004), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/reseg04/brown50.pdf (concluding that "students in highly segregated neighborhood schools
are many times more likely to be in schools of concentrated poverty").
33.
See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 32, at 21-22 (detailing poverty concentrated school disadvantages such as school deterioration, lack of resources, less experienced teachers and fewer college
preparatory courses).
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Although the Supreme Court has issued decisions to help facilitate
the provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students,34
the Court has also issued opinions-three, in particular, referred to as the
"resegregation trilogy" 3 5-that have hindered the progress of desegregation.36 The Court's decisions in Board of Education of Oklahoma City v.
Dowell,37 Freeman v. Pitts,38 and Missouri v. Jenkins39 have relaxed
school districts' responsibilities and duties to eliminate all vestiges of
racial segregation, thereby permitting the premature dissolution of federally mandated desegregation decrees when racial imbalance persists.40
The Supreme Court's decision in Dowell evidences its reluctance to
continue taking an active role in the desegregation of public educational
institutions 4' as it had in previous cases. 42 The Court's decision appears
to be guided by its pronouncement that "federal supervision of local
school systems [was] intended as a temporary measure to remedy past
discrimination. ' 43 To hasten the return of educational decisions to local
school officials, the Court set forth a less stringent test to determine
whether a school system has successfully complied with a desegregation
decree so as to warrant its dissolution. Unlike the Court's demand in
Green v. County School Board of New Kent County" that school boards
34.
See supra notes 24, 27; see also Green v. County Sch. Bd.of New Kent County, Va., 391
U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (placing an "affirmative duty" on school boards operating segregated systems "to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 11),
349 U.S. 294,
301 (1955) (instructing district courts to enter desegregation decrees that mandate the admission of
African-American students into public schools "with all deliberate speed").
35.
Ware, supra note 19, at 63.
36.
See id.at 65 (referring to the three cases as "a three-fold shift from an affirmative duty to
eliminate all vestiges of segregation to acquiescence to resegregation"). Arguably, Supreme Court
cases decided prior to the resegregation trilogy have also hindered the progress of desegregation and
educational equality. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (prohibiting the imposition
of multi-district desegregation policies to remedy single-district intentional discrimination); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding local property taxation as a
constitutionally permissible method for school financing despite resulting disparities in per-student
expenditures).
37.
498 U.S. 237 (1991).
38. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
39.
515 U.S. 70 (1995).
40.
See Nancy Levit, Embracing Segregation: The Jurisprudenceof Choice and Diversity in
Race andSex Separatism in Schools, 2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 455, 465-73 (discussing the impact of the
three cases on district courts' decisions to dissolve desegregation orders, "even if desegregation
actually had not been accomplished").
41.
See Holley, supra note 27, at 1090 & n.31 (describing the Supreme Court's decisions in
Dowell, Freeman and Jenkins as evidence of its "hostility towards federal court supervision of
school desegregation").
42.
See supra note 34; see also Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 471,
487 (1982) (striking down a state initiative intended to "interfere... with desegregative busing");
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25, 30 (1971) (upholding the ordering of
a racial balance requirement and bus transportation as permissible tools of school desegregation).
43.
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added); see also id. (stating that desegregation decrees
"are not intended to operate in perpetuity"). Some scholars suggest that such statements evidence
the Court's "impatience with the duration of desegregation orders," or perhaps, "an abandonment of
the original purpose" of desegregation. See Levit, supranote 40, at 472 & n.91.
44.
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
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develop systems "in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch, 4 5 the Dowell Court instructed lower courts to ask only
"whether the Board had complied in good faith with the desegregation
decree . . .and whether the vestiges of past discrimination had been

eliminated to the extent practicable.',46 This test appears to concede the
point that the complete elimination of segregation is impractical; therefore, school districts that demonstrate a good faith effort to desegregate
and eliminate traces of past discrimination can be released from judicial
control and supervision even though circumstances remain that hinder
desegregation.47
The Court reiterated the Dowell test in Freeman as it continued to
chip away at the desegregation safeguards that it had previously helped
to establish.4 8 In Freeman, respondents argued that a district court
should not relinquish its supervision and control over a school system
until the school district fully complies with all components of a desegregation decree. 49 The Court rejected this argument and sanctioned the
incremental withdrawal of judicial supervision once a school system is
determined to be in compliance with certain categories of a desegregation order.50 In arriving at its decision, the Court once again relied heavily on its desire to return control of school systems to state and local officials. 5'
Guided by the "ultimate objective . . .to return school districts to

the control of local authorities," the Court reasoned that such restoration
is "essential to restore [local authorities'] true accountability in our governmental system., 52 One must be mindful, however, that local authorities' previous control of school systems resulted in unequal and segregated dual systems-systems that necessitated the imposition of courtordered desegregation decrees in attempts to remedy them. Over ten
years passed before the local school officials in Freeman took affirmative steps to adhere to the Supreme Court's mandate that school districts

45.
Green, 391 U.S. at 438; see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 15 (stating that the Supreme Court's
objective "remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation"
(emphasis added)).
46.
Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
47.
See Holley, supra note 27, at 1092 (concluding that the Dowell test excludes the possibility of resegregation as a factor for determining unitary status so as to warrant the dissolution of a
desegregation decree); Levit, supra note 40, at 464-65 (discussing the Dowell test as an invitation to
lower courts to dissolve desegregation decrees even if segregation continues to exist); Ware, supra
note 19, at 64 (concluding that the Dowell test allows for a finding of unitary status despite a showing that schools remained racially segregated due to housing patterns).
48.
Freeman,503 U.S. at 492.
49.
See id. at 471.
50.
See id. at 490-9 1.
51.
See id. at 489-90 ("Partial relinquishment of judicial control ... can be an important and
significant step in fulfilling the district court's duty to return the operations and control of schools to
local authorities.").
52. Id.at 489-90.
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desegregate "with all deliberate speed,, 53 and such steps were initiated
only after the respondents filed their lawsuit. 54 At the time the Court
decided Freeman, over thirty-five years had passed since its decision in
Brown I. Nevertheless, the local DeKalb County school officials continued to operate a school system that was violative of the desegregation
order. 55 Such failures and delayed action should cause district courts and
the Supreme Court pause when considering the arguably premature return of school systems to local control.
The Freeman decision may also hinder desegregation efforts because of its discussion regarding a school district's duty (or lack thereof)
to remedy racial imbalance that continues to exist in its schools. The
respondents in Freeman presented evidence demonstrating the continuance of racial imbalance in DeKalb County schools.56 Petitioners argued
that such imbalance was not caused by prior de jure discrimination;
rather, it was due to demographic changes within the county. 57 The Supreme Court rejected the Eleventh Circuit's contention that the school
district "bore the responsibility for the racial imbalance, and in order to
correct that imbalance would have to take actions that 'may be adminis58
tratively awkward, inconvenient, and even bizarre in some situations.'
The Court clarified that "[o]nce racial imbalance traceable to the constitutional violation has been remedied, a school district is under no duty to
remedy an imbalance that is caused by demographic factors., 59 When
coupled with the Court's sanctioning of the incremental withdrawal of
judicial supervision once a school district has been deemed to have complied with certain provisions of a desegregation decree, this pronouncement begs the question: With whom does the duty lie to desegregate
schools if it does not lie with local school districts? If, as in Freeman,
school districts are partially or fully released from their desegregation
orders even though their minority students continue to attend racially
segregated schools, then the likelihood of achieving true desegregation in
public education and the benefits that arise from such educational environments is doubtful.
School districts' ability to remedy resegregation of their educational
institutions may be further hindered by the Supreme Court's decision in
Jenkins. The district court in Jenkins ordered a variety of educational
programs and initiatives in its efforts to improve the educational quality
53.
Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301.
54. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 472 (describing the school system's reluctant response to desegregation mandates).
55.
See id.at 474 (discussing the district court's findings that the school system continued to
be segregated with regards to "teacher and principal assignments, resource allocation, and quality of
education").
56. Id.at 476-77.
57. Id.at 478.
58. Id.at 485 (citing Swann, 402 U.S. at 28).
59. Id. at 469 (citations omitted).
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of the Kansas City, Missouri School District and to eliminate all vestiges
of segregation. 60 The two measures challenged by the State were salary
increases for instructional and noninstructional staff and remedial quality
education programs. 6' The State argued that the requirement of salary
increases for teachers and non-teaching staff exceeded the district court's
remedial authority. 62 In upholding the State's challenge, the Supreme
Court agreed that a district court cannot use 'interdistrict' measures to
remedy 'intradistrict' constitutional violations. 63 Concluding that measures such as salary increases were motivated by the district court's pursuit of "desegregative attractiveness," 64 the Court rejected the Eighth
Circuit's contention that "[v]oluntary interdistrict remedies may be used
to make meaningful integration possible in a predominantly minority
district. 65 This rejection greatly restricts district courts' ability to fashion
effective measures that can be used to remedy the devastating effects of
segregation.
Perhaps one of the most harmful lingering effects of segregation is
minority students' lack of academic achievement. 66 Greater numbers of
African-American students fail to complete high school as compared to
white students. 67 African-American students, many of whom attend racially imbalanced schools, routinely score lower than their white counterparts on standardized tests.68 Fewer African-American adults, as
60. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 75-78 (1995) (describing the district court's ordering of class reductions, magnet school programs, capital improvements, and salary increases as
measures to improve academic achievement and remedy effects of segregation).
61.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80.
62. Id. at 84.
63.
Id. at 89-98 (citations omitted).
64. Id. at 80 (citation omitted). According to the Court, "desegregative attractiveness" refers
to the implementation of programs and initiatives that will improve the attractiveness of schools
within a school district such that nonminority students who are not presently attending schools
within the district will decide to enroll, thereby helping to desegregate the schools. See id. at 91-92.
65.
Id. at 91 (citing Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1988)).
66. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that segregation has a negative impact on the educational development of African-American children); Lisa J. Holmes, Comment, After Grutter: Ensuring Diversity in K-12 Schools, 52 UCLA L. REv. 563, 586-87 (2004) (discussing research suggesting
that segregated educational environments may have detrimental effects on the academic development of minority children); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Achieving Equalityof EducationalOpportunity
in the Wake of JudicialRetreatfrom Race Sensitive Remedies: Lessonsfrom North Carolina,52 AM.
U. L. REv. 1477, 1485 & n.33 (2003) (citing research showing segregation's adverse effects on
minority students' academic achievements).
67.
In 2004, the drop out rate for African-Americans age 16-24 was 11.8% as compared to
6.8% for Whites. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006,
STATUS
DROPOUT
RATES
BY
RACE/ETHNICITY
tbl.26-1
(2006),
available
at

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=48 1.
68.
See Michael J. Songer, Note, Decline of Title VII DisparateImpact: The Role of the 1991
Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of FederalJudges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 267-68 (2005).
Songer reported:
The most recent study by the Civil Rights Project at Harvard University found that 70%
of minority children attend American schools with majority-minority populations. More
than one-third of these children attend schools that are comprised of at least 90% African
American students. African American students continue to score significantly lower than
White students on standardized tests used in college and graduate school admissions.
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compared to white adults, obtain a college education. 69 Such achievement gaps are due, in part, to disparities existing between the quality of
teachers at poor, minority-concentrated schools and their more affluent,
white counterparts.
For example, novice teachers, who are obviously not as qualified as
more experienced teachers, are disproportionately assigned to high poverty, majority-minority schools. 70 The percentage of high school students attending high-minority, high-poverty schools that are taught English, science, and mathematics by "teachers who have neither a major nor
certification in the subject they teach" is twice the percentage of students
encountering the same experience at schools with low minority and poverty populations. 7' Obviously, such disparities have a detrimental impact
on minority students' academic achievement. If such disparities could be
rectified, then the positive impact on student achievement could be tremendous, and the hope of eliminating all vestiges of segregation could
become a reality.
This is what the district court in Jenkins attempted to accomplish by
72
ordering the State to fund salary increases in its desegregation efforts.
Remedial measures such as salary increases can positively affect teacher
quality disparities and, consequently, student achievement disparities, by
attracting more highly-qualified teachers and personnel to minorityconcentrated schools. Exposing minority students to more experienced,
more educated and more effective teachers will improve their educational opportunities and lessen the detrimental effects of segregation and
past discrimination.73 Unfortunately, by finding that the district court
exceeded its remedial authority by ordering salary increases for school
personnel, the Supreme Court deprived district courts of a valuable tool

Id. (footnotes omitted). Keith R. Walsh, Book Note, Color-BlindRacism in Grutter and Gratz, 24

B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 443, 450-51 (2004) (discussing the gap between African-American and
white students' scores on standardized admissions tests).
69.
See Walsh, supra note 68, at 450 & n.49 (noting that 28% of white adults are college
educated as compared to 16% of African-American adults and that "[a]s of 2000, only 17.8% of
African Americans over the age of twenty-five had completed four or more years of college, while
34% of their white counterparts could say the same" (citation omitted)).
70.
Novice teachers are assigned to minority concentrated schools at twice the rate as those
assigned to schools with low minority populations. HEATHER G. PESKE & KATI HAYCOCK, THE
EDUC. TRUST, TEACHING INEQUALITY: How POOR AND MINORITY STUDENTS ARE SHORTCHANGED
ON
TEACHER
QUALITY
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www2.edtrust.org/NR/
rdonlyres/O1ODBD9F-CED8-4D2B-9EOD-91B446746ED3/0/TQReportJune2006.pdf.
71.
NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION, OUT-OF-FIELD
TEACHING BY POVERTY CONCENTRATION AND MINORITY ENROLLMENT
1 (2004), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2004/section4/indicator24.asp; see also PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra

note 70, at 3 (noting that "[iln secondary schools serving the most minority students, almost one in
three classes are assigned to an out-of-field teacher compared to about one in five in low-minority
schools").
72.
See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 80.
73. See PESKE & HAYCOCK, supra note 70, at II (noting research findings indicating the

positive impact interaction with highly effective teachers can have on low-performing students).
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in their efforts to eradicate vestiges of segregation and create educational
equality.
The establishment of equality in public education for racial and ethnic minority students is also threatened by the Court's admonition regarding the use of student achievement levels as a measure to determine
partial unitary status. 4 After finding that the school district "had not
reached anywhere close to its 'maximum potential because the District is
still at or below national norms at many grade levels,"' 75 the district court
ordered the State to continue funding quality education programs designed to improve the educational achievement of all students, especially
African-Americans.76 The State challenged the order on the grounds that
improvement on test scores is not a requirement to achieve partial unitary
status. 77 In upholding the State's challenge, the Court directed the district court to "sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance on" student
performance on achievement tests in its determination of partial unitary
status.78 Although the district court maintained that a school district
must achieve its "maximum potential" regarding its desegregation efforts
before it can be deemed to have partially complied with a desegregation
decree, the Supreme Court rejected this test and re-imposed the lower
standard of "practicability" articulated in Dowell.79 By rejecting the district court's more stringent test, the Court invited premature findings of
partial unitary status despite the fact that minority students continue to
suffer from reductions in academic achievement.
The Court also extends this invitation by its directive to the district
court to be mindful of its end goal to return control of a school system to
state and local officials. 80 In its efforts to expedite the return of educational decisions to local control, the Court appears to have abandoned its
previous stance "that the court has not merely the power but the duty to
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory
effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." 81 As
shown by the number of schools experiencing resegregation following

74.
A previously intentionally segregated school district achieves partial unitary status when a
district court determines that the school district has successfully complied with certain, although not
all, components of a desegregation decree so as to be deemed to no longer discriminate on the basis
of race with regards to that particular component. For further discussion of the term "unitary," see
Holley, supra note 27, at ! 091 n.33.
75. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 73.
77. Id. at 101.
78. Id.
79. See id. (stating the partial unitary test as "whether the reduction in achievement by minority students attributable to prior de jure segregation has been remedied to the extent practicable"
(emphasis added)).
80.
See id. at 102 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)).
81.
Green, 391 U.S. at 438 n.4 (quoting Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154
(1965)).
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the dissolution of desegregation decrees, 82 the withdrawal of judicial
oversight, based on the relaxed standards of Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins, has had a negative impact both on the elimination of discriminatory
effects and on the prevention of such harmful effects in the future.8 3
Such impact is due, in part, to local officials' reliance on the "neighborhood school concept" when making student assignment decisions. As
demonstrated in the following section, employing student assignment
methods that are based on racially segregated neighborhoods produces
resegregation in public education and the detrimental effects that accompany such environments.
B. The NeighborhoodSchool Dilemma
Historically, the neighborhood school concept, which calls for the
assignment of students to schools that are in close proximity to their
homes, has been a preferred method for making school assignment decisions. 84 Many argue that adherence to neighborhood schools provide
educational benefits ranging from increased parental and community
involvement that results in improved student achievement, 85 to reductions in transportation costs, which provide additional funding for teacher

82.
See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education s "Perfect Storm "? RacialResegregation,HighStakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina,81 N.C. L. REV. 1375,
1394-95 (2003) (noting the resegregation consequences flowing from the dissolution of a thirty-yearold desegregation decree) Boger stated:
The consequences flowing from the Capacchione [v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools]
ruling were swift and dramatic: in the 2002-2003 school year, the number of CharlotteMecklenburg schools with minority enrollment of 91% to 100% more than doubled from
the previous year-from seven elementary schools in 2001-2002 to sixteen in 2002-2003,
and from two middle schools to four. There was no change in the number of elementary
and middle schools with minority enrollment of 20% or less.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Holley, supra note 27, at 1095-96 & n.60 (noting that thirty-four of
the thirty-eight school districts that have achieved unitary status since the Dowell decision have
experienced resegregation as measured by "a decrease in the exposure of black students to white
students, and the exposure of Latino students to white students").
83.
See ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 32, at 18 (attributing the resegregation trend "to the
impact of three Supreme Court decisions between 1991 and 1995 limiting school desegregation and
authorizing a return to segregated neighborhood schools").
84.
See Swann, 402 U.S. at 28 (noting the Supreme Court's recognition that "[aIll things
being equal.., it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their homes"); see also
Levit, supra note 40, at 456 & n.6 (referring to state initiatives to pass and implement "Neighborhood Schools Acts"). Student assignments based on proximity to one's home are especially favored
when compared to the alternative of busing. See Davison M. Douglas, The Quest for Freedom in the
Post-Brown South: Desegregation and White Self-Interest, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 689, 746-47
(2004) (quoting former North Carolina Governor Robert Scott as stating, "The neighborhood-school
concept has been the strength of our public education system in North Carolina and our state has
been committed to that policy for some time. It is sound educational policy and must be preserved."
(citation omitted)); Id.at 747 (quoting former President Richard Nixon as describing neighborhood
schools as "the most appropriate ... system" (citation omitted)); Levit, supra note 40, at 456 & n.5
(referring to Congressional anti-busing legislation setting forth the government's official policy that
"students attend neighborhood schools").
85.
Patrick James McQuillan & Kerry Suzanne Englert, The Return to NeighborhoodSchools,
ConcentratedPoverty, and Educational Opportunity:An Agenda for Reform, 28 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 739, 743 (2001).
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salaries and educational programs. 86 These benefits, however, are
greatly outweighed by the detrimental effects that accompany many
neighborhood school decisions: namely, the resegregation of elementary
and secondary schools and the overwhelming challenges that are present
in such environments.
Following the termination of desegregation decrees and the return
of educational decisions to local control, many school districts returned
to the neighborhood school concept when making their student assignment decisions.87 Considering the rate of residential segregation in
communities throughout the country, it is not surprising that such decisions have resulted in the resegregation of public schools. 88 "One-third
of all African Americans in the United States live under conditions of
intense racial segregation. 89 In 2000, over 230 American urban communities could be described as "hypersegregated" or "partially segregated." 90 Therefore, in accordance with student assignment policies that
assign students to schools based on neighborhood proximity, schools
populated by students living in these areas will also experience high levels of racial segregation, 9' which often brings about adverse educational
consequences.

86.
Kenneth O'Neil Salyer, Beyond Zelman: Reinventing Neighborhood Schools, 33 J.L. &
EDUC. 283, 287-88 (2004) (discussing the advantages of neighborhood schools). Other proffered
advantages of neighborhood schools include the following: reduction in student-teacher ratios,
reduction in travel safety hazards, creation of sense of community, and simplification of student
assignment policies. Id; see also Kevin Brown, Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Cure for De
Jure Segregation to Replicate the Disease, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 35 (1992).
87.
Molly S. McUsic, The Futureof Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of
the Public Schools, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1334, 1342 (2004) (noting school districts' reversion to
"neighborhood schools placed in segregated neighborhoods"); Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and MetropolitanIntegration: The Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24
LAW & INEQ. 269, 294, 322-23 (2006) (discussing the impact of termination of desegregation decrees and reinstitution of neighborhood schools on the resegregation of Minneapolis schools);
Speech by Theodore M Shaw: From Brown to Grutter: The Legal Strugglefor Racial Equality, 16
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 43, 52 (2004) (recounting the incident in which the Norfolk Virginia School
District expressed "its intention to return to neighborhood schools by abandoning its desegregation
plan after a declaration of unitary status").
88. Michael Selmi, Race in the City: The Triumph of Diversity and the Loss of Integration,22
J.L. & POL. 49, 69 (2006) (noting that school segregation "follows housing segregation"); Ware,
supra note 19, at 56 (attributing the failure of desegregation efforts in many urban schools to pervasive "segregated housing patterns").
89. Ware, supra note 19, at 65 (quoting DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON,
AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 77 (1993)).
90. Boger, supra note 82, at 1402 & n.97 (detailing residential segregation levels in metropolitan areas).
91.
Id. at 1400 (predicting that "residential segregation will prove especially likely to lead to
school resegregation if districts choose student assignment strategies based on neighborhood
schools"); see also id. at 1407-08 (discussing racial segregation increases in North Carolina schools
following the implementation of neighborhood schools assignment plans); GARY ORFIELD &
CHUNGMEI LEE, HARV. C.R. PROJECT, RACIAL TRANSFORMATION AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF

SEGREGATION 9 (2006), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/deseg/
RacialTransformation.pdf (noting that "[s]ince the Supreme Court authorized a return to segregated
neighborhood schools . . . , the percentage of black students attending majority nonwhite schools
increased in all regions from 66 percent in 1991 to 73 percent in 2003-4") (footnote omitted).
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Research shows that students attending racially segregated schools,
which are often economically segregated as well, 92 encounter tremendous
challenges that greatly hinder their educational achievement. Students
attending schools with majority minority student populations are often
educated in "substandard and deteriorating facilities. 93 Their learning
environments often suffer from "shortages of library books, computers,
or laboratory equipment., 94 The teachers who educate them are often
less qualified than those teaching at racially and economically diverse
schools. 95 This lack of resources leads to disparities in minority stu96
dents' academic achievement as measured by standardized tests scores,
98
high school drop-out and graduation rates, 97 college matriculation rates,
and post-graduate degrees. 99
Not only are students attending segregated schools forced to overcome educational resources deficiencies, but they are also deprived of
the educational benefits related to interacting with students who possess
higher educational aspirations. Unfortunately, many minority students
who live in lower-income, racially segregated neighborhoods and attend
lower performing schools within those neighborhoods have low expectations regarding academic achievement. In fact, some minority communities suffer from a culture that devalues academic success,1 00 which significantly undermines minority students' academic expectations and aspirations. As noted by scholar John Charles Boger:
[A] pupil's achievement is strongly related to the educational backgrounds and aspirations of the other students in the
92.
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
93.
Levit, supra note 40, at 497 (quoting Leland Ware, Redlining Learners: Delaware's
Neighborhood Schools Act, 20 DEL. LAW. 14, 16 (2002)).
94.
Boger, supra note 82, at 1382.
95.
Id. at 1447 (citations omitted); see also Levit, supra note 40, at 498; supra notes 69-70
and accompanying text.
96.
See Curt A. Levey, Racial Preferences in Admissions. Myths, Harms, andAlternatives, 66
ALB. L. REV. 489, 502 (2003) (discussing racial disparities in minority and nonminority students'
standardized test scores); Walsh, supra note 68 (discussing disparities between Blacks and Whites
regarding their performance on standardized tests).
97.
In 2004, the high school drop out rate for African-American students age 16-24 was
11.8% compared to 6.8% for their white counterparts. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, STATUS DROPOUT RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY tbl.26-1 (2006),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=481. In 2005, fewer
Blacks than Whites age 25-29 years old had completed high school (87% vs. 93%). NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATrAINMENT tbl.31-1

(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=492.
98.
In 2005, only 49.0% of African-Americans between the ages of 25-29 had completed at
least some college as compared to 64.3% of Whites. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE
CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATFAINMENT tbl.31-2 (2006), available at

http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=493;
see also A. Mechele
Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1725, 1769-70 (2004).
99.
In 2005, 34.1% of Whites between the ages of 25-29 had obtained a bachelor's degree or
higher while only 17.5% of Blacks had achieved the same educational success. NAT'L CTR. FOR
EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT tbl.31-3

(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/section3/table.asp?tablelD=494.
100.
Nelson, supra note 28, at 26 & n. 127.
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school .... Thus ... if a minority pupil from a home without much
educational strength is put with schoolmates with strong educational
backgrounds, his achievement is likely to increase.101
If, in fact, "the social characteristics of a school's student body [are] the
single most important school-related factor in predicting minority student
achievement," 10 2 student assignment plans that rely on poor, racially segregated neighborhoods will only exacerbate the current disparities existing between minority and non-minority student achievement.
Considering the detrimental impact the creation of neighborhood
schools has on desegregation efforts and, consequently, the quality of
education received by many minority students, one wonders why school
boards continue to create and advocate for them. While school boards'
decisions to adhere to neighborhood schools may be attributed, in part, to
their purported benefits, 10 3 parents' vocal opposition to busing and school
boundary proposals has also greatly influenced school boards' actions.
Due to the fact that the overwhelming majority of school boards are
elected positions, 104 their members must confront political pressures that
are brought to bear upon them by their constituents. Having particular
influence on school board members are those voting parents who organize in efforts to oppose school boundary and student assignment proposals that attempt
to diversify schools, both in terms of race and socioeco10 5

nomic status.

101.
Boger, supra note 82, at 1415 (quoting JAMES S. COLEMAN ET AL.,
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 22 (1966)).
102.
Id. (citation omitted).
103.
See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
104.
BOARDS

EQUALITY OF

See FREDERICK M. HESS, SCH. OF EDUC. AND DEP'T OF GOV'T, UNIV. OF VA., SCHOOL
AT
THE
DAWN
OF
THE
21 ST
CENTURY
5
(2002),
available
at

http://www.nsba.org/site/docs/1200/1143.pdf (reporting that in a survey of 2000 school boards, 93%
were entirely elected).
105.
While parent groups comprise 52.1% of constituent groups that are "active" in school
board elections, ethnic or racial groups only comprise 18.1%. Id. at 37 tbl.42. See also Boger, supra
note 82, at 1399-1400 (discussing parents' resistance efforts to the proposal of assigning poor, lowperforming students to schools where their children attended and to the reassignment of white,
middle-class students to lower income, lower performing schools); Dana Banker, PlantationParents
Join Busing Debate, School Boundaries Face Challenge at Meeting, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar.
27, 1995, at lB (stating the goal of parents who oppose school boundary proposals that would require their children to be bused to a predominantly Black school is to "[m]ake board members realize that this Plantation [parent] contingent is a sizable group with which to be reckoned"); John Hill,
Good Schools for All Hillsborough, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 13, 2006, at 12A (stating that
"[p]arents of upscale Westchase scolded, taunted and threatened the elected board with political
retaliation" because of their discontentment regarding the school board's student reassignment
proposal); Ginger Jenkins, Boundary Committee Endures Wrath of FallCreek Residents, HOUSTON
CMTY. NEWSPAPERS ONLINE, Apr. 11, 2004, http://www.hcnonline.com/site/index.cfm?
newsid=1 1289350&BRD=l 574&PAG=461&deptid=532207&rfi=8&xb=lutex (discussing parents'
vocal opposition to school boundary proposals that would zone their children to Title I schools,
which have high economically-disadvantaged student populations); Scott Travis, Parents Protest
Plan to Alter School Boundary, S. FLA. SUN-SENTNEL, Sept. 12, 2000, at lB (discussing parents'
opposition to a school boundary proposal that would add 163 predominantly poor, African-American
students to their children's elementary school).
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The school board members elected to govern the Humble Independent School District in Humble, Texas faced similar opposition in 2003
after announcing their proposals to redraw school boundaries.' 0 6 Because some of the boundary proposals called for certain middle-upper
class, predominantly white neighborhoods to be zoned to schools that
would have predominantly minority, lower-income student populations,
parents and residents residing in the predominantly white neighborhoods
voiced their dissent and lobbied school board members to vote to keep
their children at the "good" schools. 10 7 Although the decision was not
unanimous, the school board acquiesced and voted to accept boundary
proposals that would allow the parents' children to attend the more desirable schools. 10 8 Unfortunately, the same boundary decision also created
racially and economically segregated schools due to the extraction of
white, middle-class students. 10 9
If school board members continue to employ student assignment
policies that rely on racially segregated housing patterns and to yield to
political parental pressures that oppose diversification and, thereby, desegregation efforts, then the goal of attaining educational equality for
minority students will be unrealized. In attempts to avoid the harmful
costs associated with resegregation, some school districts have voluntarily implemented plans that consider students' race when making student
assignment decisions. The next section examines two such plans and
their attempts to further compelling interests via constitutional means.
II. TAKING MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS:
PUBLIC SCHOOLS' VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE-CONSCIOUS
STUDENT ASSIGNMENT PLANS

Due to the resegregation trend that is currently plaguing American
public educational institutions, school districts have begun to experiment
with various measures intended to diversify elementary and secondary
106.
Cindy Horswell, School Boundaries Draw Parents' Wrath/Humble ISD Stirs Campus
Controversy, HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 15, 2003, at A3 1.
107.
Linda Gilchriest, Tough Choices/Humble ISD Must Decide ControversialLines Issues,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 10, 2003, at 1 (discussing Fall Creek's ("an upscale subdivision with million-dollar homes") opposition to being zoned to Humble High School "because it would have a
greater number of minority and economically disadvantaged students"); see also A. Mechele
Dickerson, Caught in the Trap: PricingRacial Housing Preferences, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1273, 1280
(2005) (suggesting that parents' desire to have their children attend "good" schools "may actually be
a code for a preference to ... have their children attend nonminority schools"); Jenkins, supra note
105.
108.
Kristen Wright, Humble ISD Adopts New Boundaries/New Kingwood Park to Be Scaled
Down, HOUSTON CHRON., Sept. 2, 2004, at 1.
109.
Following adoption of the new boundaries, Humble High School was projected to be
45%-65% minority and 45%-55% economically disadvantaged. Meanwhile, more affluent Kingwood High School was projected to have a student body that was only 10%-20% minority and 5%15% economically disadvantaged. The newly created high school (to which parents lobbied school
board members to have their children attend) was projected to be 30%-50% minority and only 15%25%
economically
disadvantaged.
RECOMMENDATION (on file with author).
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schools. School districts have implemented school choice programs
whereby parents can decide which schools they would like for their child
to attend.ll 0 To encourage parents to choose schools that may have high
populations of minority, economically-disadvantaged students, many
school districts have introduced programs that provide pre-college
courses of study such as the International Baccalaureate (IB) Diploma
Program at such schools."' School districts have also created magnet
schools and programs, which have a particular theme or curricular focus,
such as science, technology, mathematics2 or performing arts, in their
efforts to achieve diverse student bodies. 1
Schools have also taken a more direct approach to achieve their diversity goals by considering students' race and ethnicity when making
student assignment decisions. Such consideration has subjected school
districts to intense and, in some cases, fatal judicial scrutiny." 3 The
school districts in the following two cases, however, successfully overcame the constitutional challenges launched against their race-conscious
student assignment plans at the circuit court level. It remains to be seen
whether the same will be true following the Supreme Court's consideration of the plans.
A. McFarland v. Jefferson County Board of Education
In its attempts to maintain an integrated school system following the
lifting of a desegregation decree, the Jefferson County Public Schools
(the "Board") implemented a student assignment plan that includes racial

110.
Robert A. Frahm, Court Takes On Race Case, School DesegregationCould Be Affected,
HARTFORD COURANT, June 6, 2006, at Al (discussing Connecticut's use of school choice to promote racial diversity in elementary and secondary education).
111.
In 2006, the Humble Independent School District in Humble, TX announced its plans to
institute the IB Diploma Program at Humble High School, which is the most racially diverse and
economically-disadvantaged high school in the district. See What in the World is IB?,
http://www.humble.kl2.tx.us/ibpage.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2006). During the 2004-2005 school
year, 25.4% of Humble High School's student population was economically disadvantaged, compared to only 3.3% at Kingwood High School. The minority enrollment at Humble High School is
also significantly greater than that at Kingwood High School (50.6% vs. 14%). See 2004-2005
ACADEMIC

EXCELLENCE

INDICATOR

SYSTEM

CAMPUS

REPORTS,

available

at

http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/2005/campus.srch.html.
112.
See Hill, supra note 105 (discussing a school district's implementation of school choice as
a means to "maintain integrated schools by making them more attractive to residents outside their
neighborhoods"); Harold A. McDougall, Brown at Sixty: The Casefor Black Reparations,47 HOW.
L.J. 863, 892 (2004) (discussing the goal of magnet schools "to accomplish or maintain desegregation").
113. See, e.g., Eisenberg ex rel. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 197 F.3d 123,
124-25 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating a race-conscious student transfer plan that denied students'
transfer requests if they would have an adverse impact on the assigned or requested school's diversity levels); Tuttle ex rel. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698, 701-02 (4th Cir. 1999)
(invalidating an assignment plan that based admission into an alternative kindergarten in part on
students' race and ethnicity); Wessman ex rel. Wessman v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 791-92 (1st Cir.
1998) (invalidating Boston Latin School's race-conscious admissions policy).
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guidelines. 14 While students have the ability to choose which school to
attend, their ultimate assignment can be affected by the operation of the
racial guidelines, which require African-American student enrollment to
be "at least 15% and no more than 50%" of the student body." 5 Although many other non-racial factors affect student assignment, the racial
guidelines prohibit some students' admission into particular schools or
academic programs based on their race. 1 6 Because of such effect, students and parents challenged the constitutionality of the Board's raceconscious student assignment plan.
In reviewing the constitutionality of the plan, the district court applied strict scrutiny, which required the Board to demonstrate that its use
of race furthers a compelling governmental interest and does so using
narrowly tailored means.' '7 In formulating what appears to be a novel
justification for the use of race in education, the court held that the maintenance of racially integrated elementary and secondary schools constitutes a compelling interest. 1 8 In assessing the Board's asserted interests,'19 the court found that the educational and societal benefits that are
derived from racial diversity in higher education are also produced in the
context of elementary and secondary education.1 20 The court accepted
the Board's argument that "school integration benefits the system as a
whole by creating a system of roughly equal components, . . . not one
rich and another poor, not one Black and another White.' 2 1 Finally, in
holding that the Board's interests are compelling, the court held that the
Board was not engaged in unconstitutional "racial balancing" because of
its demonstrated commitment to integration and educational equality and
the "academic, social and institutional benefits [they] achieve[ ]y,122
See McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F. Supp. 2d 834, 836
114.
(W.D. Ky. 2004), aff'd 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub nom. Meredith ex rel.
McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915).
115.
McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 842.
116.

For instance, if an African-American student attempts to enroll into a school that already

has a black student composition of 50%, then the racial guideline will operate to deny him admission
into that particular school since his enrollment would cause the school to exceed its cap on AfricanAmerican enrollment. Although the Board's open choice policy permits the student to choose the
school he would like to attend, "a student's race ... could determine whether that student receives
his or her first, second, third or fourth choice of school." See id.
117.
118.

See id. at 837, 848-49.
See id. at 855.

119.
The Court's statement of the Board's asserted interests is as follows:
To give all students the benefits of an education in a racially integrated school and to
maintain community commitment to the entire school system precisely express the
Board's own vision of Brown 's promise. The benefits the [Board] hopes to achieve go to
the heart of its educational mission: (1) a better academic education for all students; (2)
better appreciation of our political and cultural heritage for all students; (3) more competitive and attractive public schools; and (4) broader community support for all [the
Board] schools.

Id. at 849 n.29.
120.

See id. at 853.

121.
122.

Id. at 854.
Id. at 855.
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Not only did the district court find that the Board used race in its
pursuit of compelling interests, but it also concluded that, in most re23
spects, it utilized narrowly tailored means to pursue such interests.
The court applied the following four criteria in determining the constitutionality of the race-conscious student assignment plan:
(1) whether the 2001 Plan amounts to a quota that seeks a fixed number of desirable minority students and insulates one group of applicants from another, (2) whether the applicant is afforded individualized review, (3) whether the 2001 Plan "unduly harm[s] members of
any racial group," and (4) whether [the Board] has given "serious,
good faith consideration
of workable race-neutral alternatives" to
24
achieve its goals.1

In finding that the racial guidelines did not operate as a quota, the district
court reasoned that they represented a "quite flexible and broad target
range," such as that permitted in Grutter, and not a "relatively precise
target." 125 This reasoning, however, fails to address the fact that the
"target range" is actually a Board requirement that African-American
students comprise 15%-50% of a school's student enrollment.1 26 The
Board's formulation of its diversity goal as a numerical mandate may
prove to be fatal
in its quest to seek constitutional approval from the Su27
preme Court. 1
Related to the quota criteria is the narrowly tailored requirement
that race-conscious student assignment plans afford each student holistic,
individualized review. Unlike other courts that have held that the requirement is inapplicable in the context of elementary and secondary
education, 2 8 the district court considered the requirement and found that
the Board's plan allows for individualized review, albeit "of a different
' 129
kind in a different context than the Supreme Court found in Grutter."
The court reasoned that the Board considers many aspects of each student's application when determining student assignments. "[R]ace is
simply one possible factor among many, acting only occasionally as a
123.
See id. at 855-62.
124.
Id. at 856 (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted).
125.
Id. at 857. The Court also relied on the varying actual percentages of Black students
present at individual schools (20.1%-50.4%) to support its conclusion that the guidelines did not
operate as a quota. See id.
126.
See id. at 842 (stating that "the 2001 Plan requires each school to seek a Black student
enrollment of at least 15% and no more than 50%" (emphasis added)).
127.
For further discussion, see infra Part Il1.
128.
See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (ParentsI1), 426 F.3d
1162, 1183 (9th Cir. 2005) ("[l]f a noncompetitive, voluntary student assignment plan is otherwise
narrowly tailored, a district need not consider each student in a individualized, holistic manner."),
cert. granted 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908); Comfort v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 418
F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2005), ("Unlike the Gratz and Grutter policies, the Lynn Plan is designed to
achieve racial diversity rather than viewpoint diversity. The only relevant criterion, then, is a student's race; individualized consideration beyond that is irrelevant to the compelling interest.") (footnote omitted), cert. denied sub noam. Comfort ex rel. Neumyer, 126 S. Ct. 798 (2005).
129.
McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
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permissible 'tipping' factor in most of the [Board] assignment process."' 30 Because the Board successfully demonstrated that its plan complied with this as well as the other narrowly tailored requirements, the
its use of race in student assignments was constitucourt concluded that131
tionally permissible.

B. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1
Employing similar rationale as that utilized by the Board in
McFarland, the Seattle School District No. 1 (the "District") also
adopted an open choice student assignment plan in its attempts to create
racially diverse schools and to prevent racial imbalance that would result
from adherence to the neighborhood school concept. 132 The plan allows
parents to choose which of the ten high schools they want their children
to attend, provided a particular school has availability. 33 To address
situations in which a school is oversubscribed, 134 the District employs
four tiebreakers, the second one being a student's race.135 Although the
District has never engaged in de jure segregation and, therefore, has
never been ordered to desegregate, 36 as had the McFarland Board, it
voluntarily uses the racial tiebreaker to ensure diversity or "balance" in
the racial composition of its public high schools. 137 The operation of the
racial tiebreaker is as follows: If a school's student population deviates
from the goal of 40% white and 60% minority (+1-15%), then the racial
tiebreaker is used to grant automatic admission to those students whose
race will enable the school to move closer to the desired racial composition. 138 Conversely, the racial tiebreaker also operates to deny admission
to those students whose race does not further the District's diversity
goals. 139 Because the District, a state actor, utilizes student assignment
policies that are based, in part, on race, such policies are subject to strict

Id.
130.
131.
The Court did conclude, however, that with regard to the traditional school assignments in
which African-American and white students are placed on separate assignment tracks, the narrowlytailored requirement was not met; therefore, the Board's use of race was constitutionally impermissible. See id. at 862-64. The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment without issuing
a detailed written opinion. See McFarland ex reL McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 416 F.3d
513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted sub noma. Meredith ex rel. McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. of
Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-915).
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents1), 377 F.3d 949,
132.
954-55, (9th Cir. 2004), rev'd en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351

(U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
Id.
133.
134.
A school is considered to be "oversubscribed" "when more students want to attend that
school than there are spaces available." See id at 955.
See id.
135.
136.
See id. at 954.
See id. at 955.
137.
138.
See id. at 955-56.
See id. at 955 n.7.
139.
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scrutiny, and thus, must employ "narrowly
tailored measures that further
1 40
compelling governmental interests."
In ParentsI, the Ninth Circuit found that the racial tiebreaker program did not pass constitutional scrutiny. While the court recognized the
pursuit of educational and societal benefits that accompany racially diverse learning environments as a compelling interest, 141 it found that the
1 42
racial tiebreaker was not narrowly tailored to further such interest.
Upon rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit in ParentsII sanctioned the
use of the racial tiebreaker and found that the measure was narrowly tailored to further the District's compelling interest in achieving racially
and ethnically diverse student bodies. 143 Similar to the district court in
McFarland, the court also recognized another compelling interest"ameliorating racial isolation or concentration in .. .high schools by
ensuring... [student] assignments do not simply replicate.., segregated
housing patterns."' 44
Both courts in Parents I and ParentsII agreed that "one compelling
reason for considering race is to achieve the educational benefits of diversity.' 45 Both courts found that the District's educational goals complied with the constitutionally permissible diversity rationale as set forth
by the Supreme Court in Grutter 46 In so doing, the court in Parents
I
147
alluded to the prevention of racial isolation as a permissible goal,
while Parents II directly held that "ameliorating real, 48
identifiable de
facto racial segregation" is a separate compelling interest.1
Although the Supreme Court has never recognized the elimination
of de facto racial segregation as a compelling interest,' 49 other lower

140.
Id. at 960 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003)). Contra Parents II, 426
F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (advocating a rational basis standard of review "because the
Seattle plan carries none of the baggage the Supreme Court has found objectionable in cases where it
has applied strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring").
141.
See Parents1, 377 F.3d at 964.
142.
See id. at 969.
143.
See Parents11,426 F.3d at 1166.
144. Id; see also James E. Ryan, Voluntary Integration:Asking the Right Questions, 67 OHIO
ST. L.J. 327, 334 (2006) (formulating the constitutional issue related to voluntary race-conscious
student assignment plans as "whether [public schools] have a compelling interest in creating or
maintaining a racially integrated student body").
145. Parents 11, 426 F.3d at 1173; see also Parents1,377 F.3d at 964.
146. See Parents 1, 377 F.3d at 962 (discussing the Supreme Court's sanctioning of the diversity rationale in Grutter); id.at 963 ("[E]ach of the School District's proffered interests in using its
racial tiebreaker falls comfortably within the diversity rationale as... articulated to (and embraced
by) the Court."); see also Parents11, 426 F.3d at 1173 (describing Grutter's compelling interest as
"the promotion of the specific educational and societal benefits that flow from diversity").
147. See Parents1,377 F.3d at 963.
148. See Parents 11,
426 F.3d at 1178-79 (emphasis added).
149. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 (1992) ("Racial balance is not to be
achieved for its own sake. It is to be pursued when racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation." (emphasis added)).
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courts have. 150 In advocating for a new compelling interest for using
race in an education context, the Ninth Circuit employed the following
reasoning:
The benefits that flow from integration (or desegregation) exist
whether or not a state actor was responsible for the earlier racial isolation. Brown's statement that "in the field of public
education... [s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal"
retains its validity today. The District is entitled to seek the benefits
of racial integration and avoid the harms of segregation even in the
of a court order deeming it a violator of the U.S. Constituabsence
51
tion.1
The court also relied on the Supreme Court's school desegregation jurisof school districts' voluntary raceprudence to justify its sanctioning
152
efforts.
integration
conscious
Unlike the three-judge panel in ParentsI, the Parents II Court held
that the race-conscious student assignment plan used by the District was
narrowly tailored to achieve its compelling interests. The contrary holdings may be due, in part, to the differing narrowly-tailored tests utilized
by the courts. Parents I identified and applied the following six narrowly-tailored requirements: (1) prohibition of racial quotas; (2) flexible, individualized consideration of each applicant; (3) prohibition of
mechanical or conclusive consideration of race; (4) earnest consideration
of race-neutral alternatives; (5) minimization of adverse impact on nonpreferred group members; and (6) time limitation. 153 Parents II, however, identified the following five factors and only applied factors two
through five: "(1) individualized consideration of applicants; (2) the absence of quotas; (3) serious, good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives to the affirmative action program; (4) that no member of any
(5) that the program had a sunset
racial group was unduly harmed; and
154
provision or some other end point.',
In finding the individualized consideration factor inapplicable to the
District's plan, the Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the different contexts
155
of higher education admissions and secondary education assignments.
The court argued that the protections afforded by individualized consideration in a competitive university admission context are not relevant in a

150.
See Parents 11, 426 F.3d at 1178 (citing district and appellate court decisions holding that
the creation and maintenance of desegregated schools serve compelling governmental interests).
151.
Id. at 1179 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
152.

See id.

See Parents1, 377 F.3d at 968-69.
153.
ParentsH, 426 F.3d at 1180.
154.
155.
See Ryan, supra note 144, at 335-36, 339 (arguing that the narrow tailoring test must be
formulated in light of the context in which race is used).
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non-competitive student assignment context. 156 The Supreme Court in
Grutter and Gratz employed this requirement "in order to prevent race
from being used as a mechanical proxy for an applicant's qualifications."' 157 As asserted by the Ninth Circuit, the requirement is unnecessary in the present case because students' qualifications are unrelated to
their assignment to a particular school. 58 If students' qualifications,
such as performance on standardized tests, grades, and artistic and athletic abilities, are not factors in student assignment decisions, then a holistic, individualized
review or consideration of such factors is not neces159
sary.
The court also argued that the differences in compelling interests
advanced by universities and elementary and secondary schools warrant
the non-application of individualized review. 60 While the use of race in
both contexts seeks to obtain the social and educational benefits of diversity, the university context lacks the second compelling interest that is
present in the high school context, which is preventing the replication of
segregated housing patterns in public education.' 61 "Because race itself
is the relevant consideration when attempting to ameliorate de facto segregation, the District's tiebreaker must necessarily focus on the race of its
students."'' 62 In the court's opinion, to require school districts to focus on
attributes other than race, such as leadership potential, grades, or life
experiences, would undermine their ability to achieve and maintain racially integrated schools.
The court in Parents I did not appear to address the different contexts of higher and secondary education as they relate to the individualized consideration requirement. They merely recognized the requirement
as a narrowly-tailored factor and applied it to the case. In so doing, the
court found that instead of considering several different factors to determine student assignment (as constitutionally mandated in Grutter and
Gratz), the racial tiebreaker "automatically and mechanically admits...
[and denies] hundreds of white and non-white applicants solely because
of their race.' 6 3 The court concluded that such operation fails the narrowly-tailored test as set forth in Grutter by establishing a "dejure [pol156. See Parents 11, 426 F.3d at 1180-81; see also Ryan, supra note 144, at 335-36, 339-44
(arguing that given the different context of employing non-merit based, non-competitive raceconscious assignment plans, public schools should not be required to give individualized consideration to each student).
157. Parents11, 426 F.3d at 1181.
158. See id.
159. See id; see also Holmes, supra note 66, at 595-96 (asserting similar arguments regarding
the inapplicability of Grutter's individualized consideration requirement to "non-merit-based raceconscious student assignment" programs).
160.
See Parents11, 426 F.3d at 1183.
161.
See id.
162.
Id. (emphasis added).
163.
See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. I (Parents1), 377 F.3d 949,
969 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added), rev'd en banc, 426 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
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icy] of automatic acceptance or rejection based on a[ ] single 'soft' variable."' 64 As demonstrated by the conflicting holdings in ParentsI and
Parents 11, the Supreme Court's formulation of the compelling interests
(if any) and the narrowly tailored requirements to advance such interests
will have a significant impact on its findings regarding the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans.
III. A GLIMPSE INSIDE THE COURT'S CRYSTAL BALL:
THE BLEAK FUTURE FOR RACE-CONSCIOUS STUDENT ASSIGNMENT

PLANS

When one considers the importance of the issues raised in Parents
Involved and Meredith and their potential impact on the provision of
educational opportunities to minority students, it is clear that the decisions will significantly contribute to the jurisprudence concerning public
education in this country. In determining the constitutionality of raceconscious student assignment plans, the Supreme Court will either sanction or prohibit school districts' use of race as a means to create and
maintain racially diverse learning environments. Unfortunately, the
Court's reasoning and holdings in previous cases involving the use of
race in education present difficult and, in all likelihood, insurmountable
challenges to the sanctioning of voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans as employed in the cases at bar.
In assessing the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious student assignment plans, the Supreme Court must first determine whether
the plans serve a compelling interest. 165 Although the Court has never
provided a precise definition of what constitutes a "compelling interest,' 166 the term is generally assumed to refer to those interests that are
"of the highest order," "overriding," or "unusually important."' 167 To
date, the Court has recognized two compelling interests that justify the
government's constitutional use of race: (1) to remedy past discrimina164.
Id. at 970 (alterations in original) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 337
(2003)).
165.
According to the Supreme Court's holding in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pehia, all
government imposed racial classifications "must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." See. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995). Therefore, the school
districts' race-conscious student assignment plans "are constitutional only if they are narrowly
tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests." Id. For a contrary view regarding
the appropriate standard of review, Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring) (advocating a rational basis standard of review "[b]ecause the Seattle plan carries none of the baggage the
Supreme Court has found objectionable in cases where it has applied strict scrutiny and narrow
tailoring"), cert. granted,126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5, 2006) (No. 05-908).
166.
See Thomas R. Bender, Does the Right to Trial by Jury Place ConstitutionalLimits on
PrejudgmentInterest?, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935, 950-51 (2006).
167.
Id at 950; see also McFarland ex rel. McFarland v. Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 330 F.
Supp. 2d 834, 850 (W.D. Ky. 2004) ("Whether an asserted interest is truly compelling is revealed
only by assessing the objective validity of the goal, its importance to [the government actor] and the
sincerity of [the government actor's] interest."), af'd, 416 F.3d 513 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. granted
sub nom. Meredith ex rel. McDonald v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (U.S. June 5,
2006) (No. 05-915).
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169
tion; 168 and (2) to achieve student body diversity in higher education.
The school districts in Meredith and Parents Involved ask the Court to
recognize a third-to achieve and maintain racially integrated elementary
and secondary schools. 70 Considering the Court's prior discussions and
holdings regarding government's remedial authority in the context of de
facto segregation and its prohibition against racial balancing, it is
unlikely that it will "expand[ ] the range of permissible uses of race" 17' to
include the creation and maintenance of racially diverse public schools.
Even if the school districts succeed in demonstrating a compelling interest, the Court will likely prohibit their continued use of race under the
challenged plans due to their failure to meet narrowly-tailored requirements.

A. De Jure vs. De Facto Segregation
Directly addressing the constitutionality of the voluntary use of race
to remedy defacto segregation in public education will be a case of first
impression for the Court. 72 The Court, however, has had previous opportunities to consider the use of race to remedy de jure segregation in
the educational context. 73 In its desegregation jurisprudence, the Court
has permitted school districts to employ race-conscious measures in their
attempts to eliminate unconstitutional dual educational systems. 74 The
measures, however, were restricted to circumstances in which schools'
student bodies and faculties were racially imbalanced as a result of the
districts' intentional discrimination. Such circumstances do not exist in
Parents Involved and Meredith.
As previously discussed, the District in ParentsInvolved has never
experienced legal segregation and, therefore, has never been subject to a
desegregation decree.175 The District's use of race does not seek to remedy the effects of intentional discrimination but rather to prevent racial
imbalance that would result from student assignments based on racially
segregated housing patterns. The same is true for the Board's utilization
of race in McFarland.

168. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986).
169. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325.
170. See Brief in Opposition at 11-13, Meredith, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL
448513; Brief in Opposition at 16, Parents Involved in Community Sch., 126 S.Ct. 2351 (U.S. June
5, 2006) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 789611.
171.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 357 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
172. See Parents II, 426 F.3d at 1173 (noting that "the Supreme Court has never decided a case
involving the consideration of race in a voluntarily imposed school assignment plan intended to
promote racially and ethnically diverse secondary schools").
173. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971); United States
v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225, 225 (1969).
174. See Montgomery County Bd.of Educ., 395 U.S. at 234-36 (sanctioning the establishment
of racial ratios for school faculties as a desegregation measure); see also Swann, 402 U.S. at 25
(permitting the use of racial mathematical ratios to ensure student body diversity).
175. See Parents1, 377 F.3d at 954.
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Although the Board had previously been subject to a desegregation
decree, the decree was dissolved in June 2000, ten months prior to the
Board's adoption of the race-conscious student assignment plan. 176 To
justify the dissolution of the decree, the district court found that "[t]o the
greatest extent practicable, the Decree has eliminated the vestiges associ177
ated with the former policy of segregation and its pernicious effects."
Therefore, arguably, the Board's use of racial guidelines is not necessary
to eliminate vestiges of racial discrimination since such effects have been
deemed to already have been eliminated. Instead, the Board utilizes the
racial guidelines to maintain the racially integrated schools created under
the desegregation decree.
As noted by the district court responsible for lifting the decree in
McFarland, student assignment racial guidelines and ratios "[a]re
shielded from normal constitutional scrutiny" if employed under a federally mandated desegregation order.' 78 Due to school districts' blatant
disregard for the Supreme Court's mandate to desegregate, there existed
an urgent need for courts to take an active role in directing desegregation
efforts. 179 Within this role, courts issued various desegregation mandates, and school districts implemented various policies and programs in
their efforts to comply with such mandates.1 80 Even though "voluntary
school integration" may be viewed "as an extension of the Supreme
Court's school desegregation jurisprudence,"' 81 it does not necessarily
follow that policies implemented under the legal protection of a desegregation decree will survive constitutional scrutiny once the order has been
lifted. 182
As argued in Parents Involved and Meredith, the context in which
state actors use race and ethnicity is extremely important when determin-

176.
177.

See McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 841.
Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. (Hampton l), 102 F. Supp. 2d 358, 360 (W.D.

Ky. 2000).
Hampton If, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 377; see also Hampton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.
178.
(Hampton 1) 72 F. Supp. 2d 753, 777 (W.D. Ky. 1999) ("When the Board acts pursuant to the continuing Decree, it acts lawfully.").
179.
See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471-72 (1992) (acknowledging school districts' delay
in complying with Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), desegregation mandates); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (instructing district courts to enter desegregation decrees to require schools to desegregate "with all
deliberate speed").
180.
See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968);
Swann, 402 U.S. at 25.
McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 851; see also Parents I, 426 F.3d at 1179 (concluding that
181.
the Supreme Court's reference to "the voluntary integrationof schools as sound educational policy

within the discretion of local school officials" supports the Court's finding that "[t]he District is
entitled to seek the benefits of racial integration and avoid the harms of segregation even in the
absence of a court order deeming it a violator of the U.S. Constitution" (emphasis in original)).
182.

See, e.g., Hampton 11, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 379, 381 (holding that the Board's race-

conscious magnet school student assignment plan that had previously been permissible under the
desegregation decree was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest).
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ing the constitutionality of their usage.183 Just as the benefits attained by
using race in elementary and secondary education may differ from those
attained from using race in higher education, the necessity of racial considerations in federally mandated student assignment plans may differ
from the necessity of such considerations in voluntary plans. In Jenkins,
the Supreme Court clarified that its pronouncement in Brown I "was tied
purely to de jure segregation, not de facto segregation."'' 84 Because
states had intentionally required Blacks to attend separate, inferior
schools, states had an affirmative duty to implement those measures that
would effectively eliminate dual educational systems.' 85 The Court
found that measures involving racial guidelines and ratios were necessary to remedy the harms caused by dejure segregation. 86 Once states
had practically eliminated the harms associated with dejure segregation,
the Court held that desegregation duties had been fulfilled since "mere de
facto segregation (unaccompanied by discriminatory inequalities in educational resources) does not constitute a continuing harm after the end of
dejure segregation. ' 87 In Freeman, the Court further clarified that with
regard to its jurisprudence concerning the imposition of "'awkward,'
'inconvenient,' and 'even bizarre' measures to achieve racial balance in
student assignment," such measures were reserved to the context of de
the imbalance is attributable . . . to
jure segregation, not phases "when
' 188
independent demographic forces."
The current Supreme Court may rely on this rationale to find that
the elimination of racial isolation attributable to de facto segregation in
public schools does not justify the use of racial guidelines and tiebreakers in voluntary student assignment plans. In its reluctance to expand the
justifications for the voluntary use of racial classifications, the Court may
confine such race-based measures to the context of de jure segregation,
89
which, as previously discussed, is inapplicable in the present cases.'
B. RacialBalancing
Despite the various contexts in which race and ethnicity have been
employed to achieve governmental interests, the Supreme Court has routinely rejected voluntary racial balancing as a permissible interest to jus426 F.3d at 1173 ("[C]ontext matters when reviewing race-based govern183.
See Parents 11,
mental action under the Equal Protection Clause." (quoting Gnitter, 539 U.S. at 326)); McFarland,
330 F. Supp. 2d at 849 ("The different context 'matters' because, under the Equal Protection Clause,
'not every decision influenced by race is equally objectionable."' (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at
327)).
184.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 120 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
185.
See Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38.
See supra note 168.
186.
187. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 122 (Thomas, J., concurring).
188.
Freeman,503 U.S. at 493.
189.
See Parents 11, 426 F.3d at 1208 n.17 (Bea, J., dissenting) (noting that the Supreme
Court's desegregation jurisprudence sanctions the use of race "to combat past de jure segregation,"
not "to achieve racial balance absent dejure segregation").
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tify their usage.' 9° In rejecting racial balancing "for its own sake," the
Court in Freeman limited its pursuit to those circumstances in which
"racial imbalance has been caused by a constitutional violation."1' 91 Considering the arguments advanced by the petitioners in Parents Involved
and Meredith,192 it is apparent that both school districts will have to
overcome the Court's prohibition against racial balancing to sustain their
utilization of race-conscious student assignment plans.
In Grutter,the Supreme Court attempted to distinguish between racial balancing and the pursuit of a "critical mass" of minority students.
According to the Court, a school's attempt "to assure within [a] student
body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because 1of
93
its race or ethnic origin" amounts to unconstitutional racial balancing.
If, however, a school defines its diversity pursuits "by reference to the
educational benefits that diversity is designed to produce," then such
pursuits may be constitutionally permissible. 94 The respondents in Parents Involved and Meredith argue that their race-conscious plans satisfy
this test.
The respondents in Parents Involved argue that the District's plan,
including the integration tiebreaker, does not amount to racial balancing
because it does "not seek to achieve a pre-determined racial distribution
in any school," as proscribed by the Constitution. 9 5 Rather, the plan
seeks to afford white and minority students the opportunity to attend
popular schools that may not be close to their neighborhoods. 196 Similarly, the respondents in Meredith also argue that their use of racial
190.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 ("[O]utright racial balancing . .. is patently unconstitutional."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (rejecting racial balancing
as facially invalid).
191.
Freeman,503 U.S. at 494.
192.
For example, one of the questions presented by the petitioner in ParentsInvolved asks the
following:
May a school district that is not racially segregated and that normally permits a student to
attend any high school of her choosing deny a child admission to her chosen school
solely because of her race in an effort to achieve a desired racialbalance in particular
schools, or does such racial balancing violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 126
S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (No. 05-908), 2006 WL 1579631 (emphasis added); see also Brief of Petitioner at
5, Meredith v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (No. 05-915), 2006 WL
2433475 (arguing that the Board's imposition of racial guidelines "is simply an action for the sake of
reflecting racial distribution").
193.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 329-30.
194.
Id. at 330. The Majority's proffered distinction drew much disagreement from other
Justices. See, e.g., id.
at 355 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (questioning how
the Law School's interest in educational benefits is not racial balancing considering the Law
School's apparent belief "that only a racially mixed student body can lead to the educational benefits
it seeks"); id.at 379, 383 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that "[s]tripped of its 'critical mass'
veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial balancing" due to its
precise attention to numbers when making admissions decisions).
195.
Brief in Opposition at 17, Parents Involved, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-908), 2006 WL
789611.
196.
Id.
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guidelines in student assignments is not motivated by constitutionally
impermissible interests.'1 97 Rather, the guidelines are used to promote the
Board's good faith interest in maintaining racial integration in its schools
and the educational benefits that flow from such environments.198 The
district court agreed with this argument and relied on the fact that the
Board had "precisely described the academic, social and institutional
benefits it achieves from integrated schools" to demonstrate that it had
not implemented the racial guidelines to achieve racial balancing
"merely for its own sake."' 199 This argument, however, fails to adequately address the potentially defeating counterargument that the 15%50% racial guidelines are mechanical mandates intended to assure a
specified percentage of African-American students in each school.2 °°
Such racial mandates, which could be termed "quotas," are absolutely
proscribed by the Constitution.20 '
As defined by the Supreme Court:
Quotas "impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or which cannot be exceeded," and "insulate the individual
from comparison with all other candidates for the available seats." In
contrast, "a permissible goal.., requires only a good-faith effort...
to come within a range demarcated by the goal itself," and permits
consideration of race as a "plus" factor in any given case while still
ensuring that each candidate "competes with all other qualified applicants. 2 °2
The attainment of a student body that is composed of no fewer than 15%
and no more than 50% African-American students is not a "goal" that the
Board strives to achieve. Rather, it is a fixed percentage with which
Schools are required to seek compliance.2 3 The respondents, in fact,
state that "[t]he Plan provides that each school (except preschools, kindergartens, alternative and special schools, and the four exempted magnet schools) shall have not less than 15% and not more than 50% black
students. 20 4 Including such directive does not appear to comport with
the Supreme Court's sanctioning of the use of race-conscious measures
in public education.
Considering that both student assignment plans seek to create and
maintain racially balanced schools, both are vulnerable to the Court's
proscription of unconstitutional racial balancing. Now that Justice
O'Connor, the drafter of the Gruttermajority, is no longer on the bench,
197.

See Brief in Opposition at 14, Meredith, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915), 2006 WL 448513.

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id.
McFarland, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 855.
See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315.
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 335 (citations omitted).
See supra note 126.

204.

Brief in Opposition at 3-4, Meredith, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (No. 05-915) (emphasis added).
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it is not apparent that the current members of the Court will accept the
racial balancing test as articulated by the majority in Grutter. Rather, the
Court may employ a more exacting standard to ensure that the interests
motivating the utilization of voluntary race-conscious plans are constitutionally permissible.
C. Individualized Consideration
A final impediment to the constitutionality of the race-conscious
plans is their failure to meet narrowly-tailored requirements. As required
by the standard of review set forth in Grutter, all admissions plans that
use racial classifications must be narrowly tailored to further compelling
interests.205 Constitutional race-conscious admissions plans are "flexible
enough to consider all pertinent elements of diversity" and "ensure that
each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes
race or ethnicity the defining feature of the application." 206 Unfortunately, the race-conscious student assignment plans utilized in Parents
Involved and Meredith fail both criteria.
Although the Ninth Circuit held that the non-competitive context of
elementary and secondary education does not require individualized review,20 7 it is doubtful that the Supreme Court will adopt a similar view.
While it is true that "context matters when reviewing" race-based measures; 20 8 the context of elementary and secondary education does not warrant the inapplicability of individualized consideration. Rather, it is,
perhaps, the most pertinent context that necessitates individualized review.
All racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny to guard
against the infringement of personal rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.20 9 Strict scrutiny is necessary to protect individuals from the potential stigmatic harms imposed by groupbased racial classifications. 210 More so than in other contexts, such protections must be afforded to children in elementary and secondary education. There is, perhaps, no other more necessary context for such protections than elementary and secondary education. The potential harms that
can result from telling a child that he or she cannot attend a particular
school because he or she is of the wrong race are immeasurable. "Harms
such as promotion of racial inferiority, strengthening of racial stereotypes, [and] heightening of racial hostility" 2 11 are precisely those harms

205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See Grutter,539 U.S. at 308.
Id. at 309 (citation omitted).
See Parents11, 426 F.3d at 1183.
Grutter,539 U.S. at 308.
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989).
Nelson, supra note 28, at 38.
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that the Court's desegregation cases attempted to remedy.2t 2 It is, therefore, highly improbable that the current Supreme Court would permit the
use of racial classifications in elementary and secondary education without requiring that they meet every element of strict scrutiny.
Contrary to the narrowly-tailored criteria set forth in Grutter, the
student assignment plans in question do not afford meaningful consideration to diversity elements other than race and ethnicity. The district court
in McFarland found that the Board's plan is constitutional because it
considers other diversity factors "such as place of residence and student
choice of school or program., 21 3 Such argument cannot sustain the constitutionality of the plan because the operation of the plan is such that
these factors are effectively irrelevant if a student attempts to enroll in a
school where the racial composition will fall outside the racial guidelines
if he or she is admitted. Despite the student's other "diversity factors,"
he or she will most likely be denied admission. 214 The racial tiebreaker
employed in ParentsInvolved operates in a similar manner. Depending
on the racial makeup of a particular school to which a student is applying
for admission, his or her race can be the determinative factor in deciding
whether he or she is admitted or denied.2t 5 In both plans, race operates
as the defining and decisive feature of a student's application, not as a
constitutionally permissible "plus" factor.2 16 Therefore, the plans are not
narrowly tailored and, thus, cannot pass constitutional scrutiny.
CONCLUSION: FULFILLING BROWN'S MANDATE
In assessing the constitutionality of voluntary race-conscious stu-

dent assignment plans in the context of de facto racial isolation in elementary and secondary schools, the Supreme Court will be guided by its
previous holdings and rationales. As it attempts to balance the proffered
interests in creating and maintaining racial integration against the constitutional protections provided by the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution, the Court will be guided by the principle that "[t]he Constitution does not prevent individuals from choosing to live together, to work
212. See, e.g., Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 (noting that legally sanctioned racial segregation
produces feelings of inferiority, which detrimentally "affects the motivation of a child to learn").
213.
McFarland,330 F. Supp. 2d at 859.
214. As noted by the district court:
[W]here the racial composition of an entire school lies near either end of the racial guidelines, the application of any student for open enrollment, transfer or even to a magnet
program could be affected. In a specific case, a student's race, whether Black or White,
could determine whether that student receives his or her first, second, third or fourth
choice of school.
Id. at 842.
215.
See Parents 1, 377 F.3d at 955-56 (explaining that the racial tiebreaker operates to grant
automatic admission to students who are of the preferred race needed to help schools attain the
desired racial ratio of white and minority students).
216. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271-72 (2003) (invalidating a race-conscious admissions policy because of its use of race as the decisive factor in an admissions decision rather than as
a "plus" factor along with many different diversity criteria).
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together, or to send their children to school together, so long as the State
does not interfere with their choices on the basis of race."2 17 Once the
inquiry has been completed, the challenged plans will most likely be
invalidated. In light of this probable outcome, local, state, and federal
officials should immediately engage in the development of race-neutral
programs and policies that can effectively address the harmful effects of
resegregation of public schools.
School officials should not retard the progress that has been made in
the provision of educational opportunities to minority students by paving
"a one-way street" to racially and economically segregated neighborhood
schools.2t 8 As previously discussed, students attending such schools face
challenges, which are often insurmountable, that range from less qualified teachers 2 19 to a culture of lower academic expectations. 220 To combat these challenges, schools should employ race-neutral student assignment plans 22I and implement educational policies that effectively address
deficiencies in the provision of equal educational opportunities to minority students.
Some schools have already begun to experiment with race-neutral
measures in their efforts to achieve racially diverse student bodies. 22
Such measures include the consideration of "diversity in student
achievement" and "diversity in socioeconomic status. 223 Limiting concentrations of low-performing students in schools will impact student
body diversity since minority students often perform lower than their
white counterparts on academic measures.2 24 Similarly, assigning students to schools based on their socioeconomic status can also achieve
racial diversity because of the existing racial gaps in socioeconomic
status.225 Such "class-based" assignment plans are also beneficial be217.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 121 (emphasis added).
218.
Hampton 11, 102 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
219.
See supra notes 70-71, 93-99 and accompanying text.
220.
See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
221.
In the context of student assignments, "race-neutral" refers to those plans that do not
classify students based on their race or ethnicity. Such plans are not "race-blind" in that they ignore
the effects of race on educational opportunities. They simply do not consider a student's race when
assigning him or her to a particular school. See Nelson, supra note 28, at 7-11 (discussing the meaning of "race-neutral" alternatives in the context of higher education admissions decisions).
222.
See, e.g., Boger, supra note 82, at 1397-1400 (discussing the implementation of raceneutral student assignment plans in Wake County, North Carolina).
223.
Id.at 1397.
224.
For example, in 2004, black and Hispanic children age 9, 13 and 17 had lower average
reading scale scores than white students. See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF
EDUCATION
STATISTICS:
2005
tbl. 108
(2006)
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dtO5108.asp. The same was true for their performance
in
mathematics.
See
id.
at
tbl. 118,
available
at
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dtO5_l 18.asp. In 2001, the average geography and
U.S. history scores for white students were higher than those achieved by black and Hispanic students. See id.
at tbl. 116, available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d05/tables/dt5_1 16.asp.
225.

See NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006 tbl.6-1

(2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/2006/sectionl/table.asp?tablelD=440 (indicating that 70% of black Fourth graders and 73% of Hispanic Fourth graders are eligible for free or
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cause they provide the added benefit of socioeconomic diversity, which
may, in fact, be more educationally beneficial than racial diversity.
Some scholars have concluded that "[n]o other single social measure is consistently more strongly related than poverty to school achievement., 22 6 Consequently, "overall socioeconomic composition of schools
seem[ ] more predictive of academic achievement than [does] a student's
individual socioeconomic status. 227 If this is true, school officials
should direct their attention to achieving and maintaining socioeconomic
diversity rather than racial diversity. Presumably, such efforts would not
be subject to the heightened and, potentially, fatal standard of strict scrutiny because they neither employ racial classifications nor seek to
achieve racial diversity benefits.2 28 Rather, they seek to achieve the educational benefits of socioeconomic integration.
In their attempts to provide equal educational opportunities to all
students, school officials should implement policies to remedy the disparities that currently exist between minority, economically disadvantaged schools and their non-minority economically advantaged counterparts.229 As often noted by many scholars, "to those who need the best
our education system has to offer, we give the least. The least welltrained teachers. The lowest-level curriculum. The oldest books. The
least instructional time. Our lowest expectations. Less, indeed, of everything that we believe makes a difference., 230 As previously discussed,
one glaring disparity is the level of teacher quality.23' Students attending
high minority, low socioeconomic schools are disproportionately subjected to being taught by less qualified teachers.232 Such inequitable
reduced lunch, as compared to only 24% of white Fourth graders); see also Dickerson, supra note
98, at 1756-68 (noting significant racial disparities in wealth as shown by levels of home ownership,
personal assets and business ownership).
226. Boger, supra note 82, at 1416.
227. Id.at 1416-17; see also supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text; Orfield, supra note
87, at 280 (concluding that peer socioeconomic status accounts for more than 75% of the difference
between minority and white students' academic achievement).
228. See Boger, supra note 82, at 1398-99 (concluding that race-neutral student assignment
plans should not be subject to strict scrutiny as long as they have not "been adopted as a mere pretext
for continuing racial assignments"); see also Levit, supra note 40, at 511 (encouraging schools to
"first try experiments that are more likely to be successful and less likely to be unconstitutional" in
their efforts to achieve educational goals).
229. See Dickerson, supra note 107, at 1291 n.82 suggesting the following:
School disparities also could be eliminated by increasing the attractiveness of "bad"
schools (for example, by giving the school a disproportionate share of new technology,
equipment or supplies, addressing its facility maintenance needs before the needs of other
schools, allowing smaller classes and student/teacher ratios, by giving the teachers in the
school greater flexibility in the classroom, etc.).
230.
See Susan P. Leviton & Matthew H. Joseph, An Adequate Educationfor All Maryland's
Children: Morally Right, Economically Necessary, and Constitutionally Required, 52 MD.L. REV.
1137, 1142 (1993).
231.
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
232. See id; see also Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A
Review of State Policy Evidence, 8 EDuC. POL'Y ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 1,
85 (2000),
http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8nl/ (reporting findings that poor minority students are taught by less
qualified teachers than their non-minority socially advantaged peers).
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learning environments negatively affect not only the quality of education
that students receive, 233 but also their psychological well-being by sending and reinforcing messages "that society doesn't care enough about
whether they learn. 234
To combat such debilitating effects, school officials should invest in
the quality of their teachers, especially those teaching in lowerperforming schools, by implementing initiatives that are designed to improve teacher qualifications and effectiveness, such as pre-service
teacher education, mentoring programs, and continual professional development.23 5 School officials should also provide incentives to encourage more qualified teachers to teach at lower-performing schools. Such
incentives could be immediate, such as salary increases or bonuses,236 or
they could be long-term, such as early retirement opportunities. More
qualified teachers may be enticed to teach at high minority, low socioeconomic schools if doing so afforded them the opportunity to be eligible
for retirement five or ten years earlier than their counterparts teaching at
more affluent schools. Coupled with intensive recruitment efforts at the
high school and college levels, schools implementing such beneficial
policies could see a significant improvement in the quality of their teachers and, consequently, the academic quality of their students.23 7
Implementing race-neutral assignment policies and teacher quality
initiatives is merely the beginning in addressing the significant costs imposed by segregated learning environments. To fulfill Brown's mandate
of educational equality, economically disadvantaged minority students
must have the opportunity to interact with peers from diverse backgrounds to broaden and heighten their educational goals and possibilities.23 8 Whether or not the Supreme Court allows schools to facilitate
this interaction through the use of race-conscious student assignment
plans, our schools and our country have the moral responsibility to ensure that such interaction takes place and that it occurs within educational institutions that provide all students access to equal resources necessary to create and fulfill their academic dreams.

233.
See id.(concluding that student outcomes and student achievement are negatively affected
by poor teacher quality).
234. See Jeannie Oakes, Education Inadequacy, Inequality, and FailedState Policy: A Synthesis of Expert Reports Preparedfor Williams v. State of California 1, 9-10, available at
http://www.decentschools.org/expert-reports/oakes-report.pdf.
235.
See Darling-Hammond, supra note 232, 57.
236.
See Dickerson, supra note 107, at 1291 n.82 (proposing the awarding of bonuses to highly
qualified teachers as incentives to teach at low-income, minority schools).
237.
See Darling-Hammond, supra note 232,
56-57 (describing significant student achievement gains made in North Carolina and Connecticut following the states' enactment of substantial
reforms targeting teacher quality).
238.
See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.

